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Abstract: Achieving food security in the Arabian Gulf is no easy task. Fuelled 
by petrodollars, the countries largely rely on imports to feed their burgeoning 
population, making them susceptible to price and supply shocks. This paper 
begins by examining why food security is so important to the Gulf, narrowing 
the focus down to Qatar. Its almost absolute dependence on food imports 
and water desalination make it a distinct and appropriate case study. The 
two most important strategies through which Qatar plans to achieve its food 
security- domestic production and foreign agro-investments will be assessed 
and weighed against their financial, political and environmental costs. Lastly, 
broader implications including the need to address rampant food waste and 
poor nutrition will be discussed, issues that are currently side-lined but without 
which no true sustainable food security can be achieved.
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Introduction
Sustainability in the Arabian Gulf is the quintessential contradictio in terminis. 
Boasting some of the world’s highest per capita incomes (WorldAtlas, 2016), carbon 
and water footprints (WWF, 2014), obesity and diabetes rates (WorldAtlas, 2015; 
IndexMundi, 2014), all while simultaneously having least renewable water and arable 
land resources (WRI, 2015; WB, 2013), the lavish cities of Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have been appropriately labelled 
as “Cities of Salt” in a popular Arab novel (Munif, 1989). The resource curse of fossil 
fuel wealth is endemic in the Gulf, funding unprecedented growth and allowing the 
region to surpass the constraints of its natural carrying capacity (Saif et al., 2014). 
The Gulf faces unique challenges: blessed with sufficient financial resources flowing 
in from oil and gas exports, but cursed with arid land and acute freshwater shortage, 
they rely heavily on food imports to sustain their booming populations. 
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However, a country with low food self-sufficiency can still score high on food 
security as long as it is able to finance the necessary food imports, which is, indeed, 
the case of the Gulf rentier states (Babar & Mirgani, 2014). Although the Gulf 
countries are quite similar in many socioeconomic aspects, the quest for food security 
reveals different ideological preferences; while the UAE mainly seeks food security 
through land investments abroad, Qatar is backing both domestic production and 
foreign agro-investments, whereas Saudi Arabia is phasing out its domestic wheat 
production- while having the region’s biggest dairy industry (Shadbolt, 2013). The 
apparent policy contradictions could partially be explained by arguing that the 
notion of food security is often conflated with that of food sovereignty in the Gulf 
(Babar & Mirgani, 2014). Although food sovereignty was first envisioned as an 
activist movement opposing state-owned agricultural operations, and taking control 
of local food production away from the government, it is precisely how it has been 
operationalized in the Gulf states, referred to by Harrigan as “macro food sovereignty” 
(2014, p.12). Thanks to their investment in local and foreign agriculture, none of the 
Gulf countries are facing threats of hunger (GHI, 2015); in fact, Global Food Security 
Index puts Kuwait, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia among the top 30 most food secure 
countries in the world (EIU, 2015). So why do food security and food sovereignty fair 
so high on the regional political and economic agenda then? Perhaps an even more 
pressing question is: how sustainable are their investments when the oil money runs 
dry? If economic diversification does not bear fruit, Gulf rentier states will not be able 
to afford the imports and ensure food security, thereby threatening the legitimacy of 
the existing ruling bargain (Woertz, 2013a).
Why does it matter?
What would happen if the Gulf of Mexico 2010 oil spill disaster were to happen 
again, only this time in the Arabian Gulf? For the oil exporting countries of the Gulf 
basin that hold about 47% of the world oil reserves (BP, 2015) this is a realistic threat, 
and a vivid reminder of the 1991 Gulf War, when hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells were 
set ablaze, causing irrevocable damage to the marine and land biota (Brans, 2001). 
Gulf countries rely heavily on desalination for potable water, with smaller states such 
as Qatar almost entirely dependent on it (99.9%) to meet their drinking water needs 
(Al Malki, 2008). Therefore, any kind of threat to the integrity of Gulf waters is likely 
to leave grave consequences on the security of industrial, residential, and agricultural 
sectors. 
The interdependence of oil and food forms part of Gulf ’s collective memory 
spanning back to 1970s, when, as pointed out by Woertz (2013a), the United States 
considered forming a grain cartel equivalent to OPEC to counterbalance the Arab 
oil embargo at the time. This threat incited Arab countries to invest in Sudan as the 
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region’s breadbasket, an agro-investment policy that was revived in the wake of the 
recent global food crises, and further expanded to include investments in many 
other developing (such as Pakistan, India, Vietnam) and developed countries alike 
(Australia). Far beyond hypothetical oil spills and political threats, the oil-food nexus 
manifests itself daily through the global price of oil, which in turn reflects the Gulf 
states’ ability to afford food imports, as well as domestic food production. When 
the 2008 global food crisis shook the world and triggered bread riots in the Middle 
Eastern countries such as Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan, Gulf countries were rather 
cushioned off with the price of oil above $100 per barrel (Woertz, 2013a). The 2010 
drought and food crisis had a multiplier effect, feeding the fire of the Arab Spring; 
inefficient food subsidies led to riots in Egypt, while millions of Syrian farmers were 
forced to migrate to urban areas and compete for menial jobs due to years of failed 
crops (The Economist, 2012). Gulf ’s reaction was to increase subsidies, public sector 
salaries, direct cash transfers, food price controls (Breisinger and Al Riffai, 2011).
Offsetting another global food crisis with generous subsidies that form part of 
the ruling bargain would not be as easy today, with the oil price kept well below 
$50 per barrel, and most of Gulf countries grappling with fiscal deficits and painful 
cuts (Saadi, 2016). Hence, self-sufficiency and foreign agro-investments began to (re)
surface as options to mitigate importation risks. 
Qatar National Food Security Programme
Around the same time when Saudis began phasing out domestic production in 
2008, neighbouring Qatar announced the formation of its National Food Security 
Programme (QNFSP), with the goal to “secure sustainable, quality foods for the 
nation of Qatar from both local and international sources”, through a balance of self-
sufficiency, foreign agro-investments and long-term bilateral arrangements for food 
imports (Abrahams, 2013). 
The Programme was charged with developing a holistic master plan for Qatar’s long-
term food security, such that would take into account water scarcity, renewable energy, 
public-private and international partnerships (Abrahams, 2013). The Programme 
delivered its mandate in 2013, upon which it was dissolved and reorganised into the 
Implementation Committee, tasked to work alongside government and private sector 
entities on carrying out the QNFSP’s suggested changes, focusing on diversification 
of international trade and investment, as well as improvements of the domestic food 
market and production (Gulf Times, 2014). 
As part of its recommendations, infrastructure and domestic market regulation 
were emphasized as needing urgent attention. Doha Central Market, built in 1981, 
is the only wholesale market in the country, through which all fresh produce must 
pass en route from producers to retailers (Seyfert et al., 2014). Since it has outdated 
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facilities with inadequate cooling storage capacity, food waste and quality reductions 
that shorten food shelf-life are endemic in the local market (Suresh, 2014). To 
overcome this barrier, QNFSP’s recommendation to upgrade the existing and build 
new markets has been acknowledged, with construction of three new central markets 
already underway, set to open to public by the end of 2016 (Fahmy, 2015). Unlike 
Oman and Saudi Arabia, which already established a 6-month strategic food reserve 
back in 2010 and 2013, respectively (Woertz, 2013a), Qatar is yet to build facilities 
for its own strategic food reserve. This vulnerability was highlighted by QNFSP in 
its master plan, urging for the creation of a strong and sustainable reserve system 
(personal communication, March 30th, 2016). Likewise, the current national water 
reserve of 1.8 days (Oxford Business Group, 2012) needs to be augmented, and a 
project by Qatar General Water and Electricity Corporation (Kahramaa) is already 
underway to build mega reservoirs that will hold a seven-day strategic water storage 
(Kahramaa, 2015). 
In addition to reforming local market and constructing strategic reserve facilities, 
growing food locally is deemed essential by Qatari decision makers, as they currently 
import more than 90% of its food (Babar & Mirgani, 2014). Figure 1 illustrates 
the dependence on imports for major food groups, and current local production 
capacities. The country is particularly vulnerable due to the fact that nearly all food 
imports come through the Saudi land border and the Strait of Hormuz, with only 
a small fraction is flown in via air (Ismail, 2015). In the wake of ongoing tensions 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as the overall geopolitical instability of the 
region, it becomes evident that the two entry points make Qatar extremely susceptible 
to import disruptions. 
Figure 1 - Local vs. imported food supply in Qatar 
Source: Adapted from AOAD Arab Agricultural Statistical Yearbook (2011) and Alpen Capital (2012)
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Domestic production
The QNFSP aims to meet up to 40% of the country’s total food demand with 
domestic production, using highly efficient agricultural technology to offset natural 
barriers of arid land and water scarcity (Scott, 2014). However, greening the desert 
might prove to be a fallacy, both financially and physically. Local farming contributes 
a mere 0.1% to the country’s GDP (Ismail, 2015), while consuming almost 60% 
of total national water use (Saif, 2012). Mohtar and Daher (2014) used the Water-
Energy-Food Nexus Tool (wefnexustool.org) developed by Chatham House to 
generate different development scenarios, and calculated food self-sufficiency options 
for Qatar based on various trade-offs between water, energy, land and financial 
resources. Their analysis shows that a 25% increase in self-sufficiency for eight select 
produce (tomatoes, cucumbers, potatoes, carrots, green onions, watermelon, lettuce 
and eggplant) would require twice as much water, energy, and finances, and almost 
four times more land in Qatar (see Figure 2). While their analysis does not specify the 
source of water or type of land and energy assumed, such estimations need to be kept 
in mind when proposing self-sufficiency in a desert environment.
Figure 2 - Additional resource needs for a 25% increase in domestic production for select produce 
(percent change)
Source: Mohtar and Daher (2014)
Since only 9,000 hectares of the nation’s arable land (less than 6% of total land 
area) is currently cultivated, the government plans to double the number of active 
farms (Ismail, 2015) in a bid to increase yields and local agricultural base. While there 
is room for expansion, the marginally productive local agriculture relies heavily on 
direct subsidies, while fast-depleting groundwater used for farming is free of charge 
and therefore represents a further, indirect subsidy, making domestic agriculture 
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unprofitable for investment. Implementing demand-side control measures such as 
subsidy removal may take many years to implement, as it would infringe upon what 
the locals have come to consider their birth right, threatening the legitimacy of the 
social contract between the royal family and the people (Mansfeld & Winckler, 2007). 
Developing a sustainable water source for domestic agriculture is imperative if a long-
term self-sufficiency is to be achieved, since current reliance on groundwater aquifers 
is four times the natural recharge rate (Abrahams, 2013).  Since most of the water is 
used for producing fodder for dairy cows and poultry, the potential of tertiary treated 
wastewater for fodder irrigation has been increasingly emphasised, resulting in the use 
of 27% of treated wastewater for fodder irrigation alone (El Emadi, 2014). However, 
treated wastewater made up only 19% of the total water supply for agriculture in 
2013 (MDPS, 2016), with the rest coming from depleting groundwater sources. The 
possibility of using treated water as a source for other agricultural purposes must also 
be evaluated, all while tackling cultural attitude barriers and educating the people, as 
such water is commonly perceived as unfit for human consumption (Darwish et al., 
2014). 
In addition to relying on treated wastewater for irrigation, Fahad al-Attiya, the 
former chairman of QNFSP, has time and time over emphasized that the country’s 
plan is to develop domestic agriculture under the condition that renewable energy 
is used to power desalination, as the most sustainable form of water supply (Baker, 
2012). While a valid proposal in theory, solar-powered desalination comes with 
its own cost, both financial and environmental. The process of desalination itself 
produces vast amounts of brine water, which gets discharged back into the Gulf, along 
with processing chemicals (Baker, 2012). So far, there have been no longitudinal 
and cross-national studies that assess the long-term consequences on the marine 
life, which makes it an even more urgent concern. While using renewable energy to 
power desalination would vastly reduce carbon emissions, the reality is that it is still 
a very energy intensive process; estimates quote that 1.8 GW of generation capacity is 
needed to meet Qatar’s agricultural ambitions, requiring about 4,000 hectares of land 
to be covered in solar panels (Baker, 2012). However, since the delivery of the master 
plan in 2013, there have been no further public announcements on the near-future 
implementation of such solar-powered desalination projects. This realization makes 
it obvious why the current focus is on increasing the utilization of treated wastewater 
and highly-efficient technologies such as hydroponics. 
Hassad Food, the 3bn dollar-worth agricultural conglomerate and investment 
arm of the country’s sovereign wealth fund, has been financing Zulal Oasis, a highly-
efficient hydroponic greenhouse pilot project at the outskirts of Doha (Burwood-
Taylor, 2015). It began in 2013 in collaboration with Primaflor Group from Spain, 
requiring no soil and recycling 100% of the irrigated water (Walker, 2015). The project 
was proven successful in growing select vegetables in harsh climatic conditions of 
the Qatari desert, recently yielding 82 pounds per square meter and exceeding all 
expectations (Walker, 2015). The focus on horticulture in domestic agriculture is 
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a prudent move in the right direction, and using hydroponics and highly efficient 
greenhouse systems is a testament that Qatar is not headed down the same 
agricultural fiasco as Saudi Arabia was with its wheat cultivation. However, as long as 
local farmers are provided with free access to the severely-depleted groundwater, the 
pressure on aquifers and unsustainable irrigation practices will continue to mount 
(Bailey and Willoughby, 2013).
International investments
Although Qatar’s admirable strive for self-sufficiency is aimed at reducing its 
dependence on imports from 90 down to 60 percent (Ismail, 2015), it will still require 
more than half of all food consumption to come from abroad. Therefore, developing 
long-term, stable importation routes is essential for achieving food security. 
Currently, Qatar’s importation base is quite small, relying on a handful of countries 
to meet most of its food demand. Saudi Arabia is the single largest supplier, providing 
Qatar with 65% of dairy and 41% of its fresh produce needs; together with Pakistan, 
India, Brazil, Australia, Jordan and the UAE, they meet the total of 80% of country’s 
fresh and frozen food demand (QNFSP, 2013). Relying on such a limited number 
of suppliers leaves the country exposed to import disruptions, with an evident need 
to develop stronger ‘grain ties’ with a diverse base of food exporters (Tetreault et al., 
2014). In addition to strengthening commercial and diplomatic ties, Qatar is one of 
the biggest regional investors (along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE) in agricultural 
land abroad. 
The controversy surrounding land purchase deals in some developing countries 
creates an unattractive investment atmosphere. Such was the case of Qatar’s 2009 
project in Kenya, when a flurry of criticism and local resistance led to cancellation of 
a 40,000 ha land lease deal (Ismail, 2015), while a 2012 Saudi project in Ethiopia led to 
violent attacks and fatalities (Woertz, 2013b). Qatar can’t afford to invest in countries 
with dubious human rights records and potential displacement and disownment 
of local farmers, as the country is already battling reputation issues regarding the 
treatment of migrant workers at home (Woertz, 2013c). The issue of human rights 
expands beyond farmer treatment and land-ownership, and into quenching the 
Qatari thirst for “virtual water”, embedded in crop and livestock production, which 
is particularly troublesome in African countries that are themselves struggling with 
water access. It is not land that is missing in Gulf countries, but sustainable source 
of water, and considering the essence of water to crop and animal growth, it would 
be more appropriate to label their land acquisitions as water grabs (GRAIN, 2012).
All of this has understandably made Qatar extremely cautious about investing 
in developing and politically unstable countries. Already in 2009, Nasser Al Hajri, 
the Chairman of QNFSP, made it clear that their strategy is different, and that they 
are not in the business of profiting from someone else’s misfortune, as the deals in 
developing nations are often not “…win-win situations and we don’t [want] to be in 
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a situation where the rich are taking away food and land of the poor”, and while not 
entirely against land acquirements, he claimed that “investing into existing businesses 
is the right choice” (Bakr, 2009).  Yet, joint ventures do not always turn out successful, 
as illustrated by the 2013 investment in a rice production company called the Indian 
Bush Food Overseas, which forged financial statements to lure Qatar into buying 
shares and investing $100 million, leaving them to now grapple with law suits and 
losses (Malviya, 2014). Qatar’s by far biggest foreign venture has been in Australia, 
where stable and welcoming investment atmosphere has allowed for purchasing and 
leasing a combined total of 300,000 ha of arable land, with both grain and animal 
production (England, 2014). Table 1 provides a summary of Qatar’s most important 
agricultural investments abroad since the establishment of Hassad Food in 2009.
Table 1 - Qatar’s key foreign agricultural ventures.
Date Key Developments
25-2-2015 Hassad Food announced negotiations with Brazil over purchases of sugar cane mills and poultry assets
09-02-2015 Hassad Food acquired 33% minority equity in Oman’s Al Saffa Foods poultry company
04-12-2014
Hassad Food files a First Information Report (FIR) against Bush Foods 
Overseas for forging financial statements and inventory records to lure 
them into investing
17-10-2014 Hassad Food announced a joint investment plan with Turkey worth $500 million in poultry, mutton and dairy sector
17-6-2014
Hassad Australia, a subsidiary of Hassad Food, purchased 14,000 ha 
of rural South Australian farmland- adding to the total of 250,000 ha 
already purchased by Hassad Food since 2009
03-04-2013 Hassad Food acquired 51% (worth $100 million) of Bush Foods Over-seas, an Indian basmati rice company
2012
Hassad Food established Senwan Pakistan, a subsidiary miller compa-
ny that processes rice from local farmers and companies and sells it to 
Qatar’s market
09-2009
Hassad Food established Hassad Australia, a subsidiary company to 
manage $500 million- worth sheep and grain properties all over Aus-
tralia, accumulating well over 300,000ha in separate purchases over the 
following years
Sources: Adapted from Mitra (2013), Beer (2014), El Dahan (2014), England (2014), Malviya (2014), 
Smith (2013), Varghese (2015), Hassad Food (2015). “Hassad Food of Qatar Acquires an Equity Interest 
in A’Saffa Foods, Oman”. Retrieved from http://www.hassad.com/English/MediaCenter/NewsCenter/
Pages/Hassad-Acquires-an-Equity-Interest-in-ASaffa-Foods-Oman.aspx
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Mahendra Shah, the Director of QNFSP, argued that there is indeed potential 
for win-win, if investment is made in lands that were marginally operated and 
had potential to improve crop yields by introducing improved mechanization 
and management techniques. He proposed a production sharing system, where 
the yields would be portioned between the investor and host countries, with an 
additional portion to be sold on the local market, and funds used to reinvest in the 
communities, thereby strengthening ties and providing urgently needed means for 
sustaining development in Asian and African developing countries (Shah, 2010). 
However, Fahad Al Attiya realized that even such production sharing agreements 
are not 100% fool-proof and ensure food security, as the receiving nation can 
always turn their back in times of crises. He argues, therefore, that Qatar’s ambition 
is not to invest around the world for the mere purpose of feeding their 2.5 million 
population, but to “go in and invest to service the country, and the region - and 
the globe at large” (Robertson, 2014). Claims to promote global food security align 
with Qatar’s desire to position itself as a global soft power; hence, it paved the way 
in establishing the Global Dry Land Alliance, a platform for arid nations to share 
knowledge, finances and technology for improve agricultural outcomes (Woertz, 
2013c). Fostering mutually-assured import partnerships and land investments is 
not a zero-sum game, and considering the fact that such deals are relatively nascent, 
more time is needed before making conclusive arguments regarding their efficacy 
in providing long-term win-win value. 
Gaps in policy
While Qatar has been focused on increasing physical supplies of food, both 
domestically and globally, it has left out some obvious and visible food security 
issues: it is not only about meeting the demand with ever-growing supply, but the 
demand itself needs to be revised and tackled. Woertz (2013a) claims that the main 
food security challenge in the Gulf is lack of micronutrients; indeed, Qatar and 
other Gulf countries top the world score on obesity and diabetes rates, with 8% of 
Qatari children stunted, 26% iron deficient and 40% overweight (ElObeid & Hassan, 
2014). In addition, it makes no economic or ecological sense to keep producing 
food without addressing rampant food waste. The low quality of much of the fresh 
fruit and vegetables moving through the local market translates into much higher 
rates of waste for the economy – estimated at around 14% on a pre-consumption 
basis, against 10% for other Middle Eastern benchmark nations (Adema, 2016). 
Quality problems are estimated to cost consumers up to QAR 900 million a year 
(QNFSP, 2013), excluding additional post-consumption waste due to low quality, 
as well as the culture where throwing away left-overs is considered a norm. While 
S. Al-Ali Mustafa  Growing food pyramids in the sand: how sustainable are Qatar’s self-sufficiency ...agro-investment policies?418
Journal of Agriculture and Environment for International Development - JAEID - 2017, 111 (2)
studies on food waste and nutrition in Qatar are gradually proliferating (Madi, 
2015; Solder, 2013), policy is yet to recognize this wasted opportunity to address 
food security via regulating and improving demand.
Conclusion
Qatar has been making great strides in securing stable food supply for its 
population. Its leaders are well-aware that reacting to food supply shocks with price 
controls and subsidies is only a short-term solution; hence, sensible investments 
in domestic agriculture focus on horticulture, while negotiating stable import 
routes and foreign ventures ensure meeting grain and meat needs.  What about 
environmental sustainability? The true test of long-term resilience of their domestic 
and foreign agro-projects is whether concerns surrounding natural resources used 
(soil and water, as well as greenhouse gas emission levels) are given appropriate 
leverage. Lack of published data on foreign agro-investments in terms of yields and 
equity, as well as continued reliance on groundwater for domestic production with 
promises of renewable energy desalination and large-scale hydroponic and similar 
solutions yet to materialize, give a negative answer. This exposes the government’s 
aim in ensuring food security and sovereignty as still relatively short-term oriented 
and pragmatic, prioritizing stability of the current socio-political system, as opposed 
to mitigating their environmental impacts. Meeting 40% of demand with domestic 
production that relies on unsustainable water sources, and diversifying trade routes 
and partners will not suffice to ensure truly sustainable food production beyond 
the oil era. 
The oil-food nexus is yet to be decoupled, as the country’s ability to grow and 
import food largely depends on its oil and gas revenues, which is not viable in the 
long run. As long as this is the case, Qatar’s food security will not be sustainable in 
either financial or environmental terms.
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